This paper develops a model of international trade and industrial evolution. Evolution is driven by the endogenous technology choices of firms which generates a rich industrial environment that includes the potential for a dramatic shakeout of firms. The likelihood, magnitude and timing of this shakeout is characterized and depends not only on the size of the innovation but also on the size of any barriers to entry and the strength of economies of scale. In this setting, trade liberalization is shown to reduce the likelihood of a shakeout, resulting in a more stable industrial structure. However, when shakeouts arise in global markets, the distribution of firm exits can vary widely across countries. Thus, open economy models of industrial evolution offer very different conclusions from closed economy models. *
Introduction
As industries evolve, prices decline, output expands and the number of firms rises at first and then falls. 1 This change in the number of firms is common enough and dramatic enough to have its own title: a shakeout. Indeed, half of the industries studied by Klepper and Graddy (1990) experienced a shakeout, with the typical drop in firm numbers being over 50% of the peak population.
Consequently, any explanation of a shakeout must address why some firms succeed but others fail.
In general, there is agreement that technological change must be part of any story since it accounts for not only the firm heterogeneity underlying shakeouts, but also rationalizes the observed price and output dynamics. In fact, the nature and rate of technological change are offered as the sole determinants of whether or not an industry has a shakeout. 2 However, case study evidence suggests that technological change cannot be the whole story. 3 To expand the range of possibilities we develop model with a rich industrial environment that allows a number of factors to magnify or dampen the impact of technological change. In particular, we emphasize the role of international trade, a factor that has been neglected to date due to a focus on the behavior of US firms in a domestic context. However, including a role for international trade is important because the nature of industrial evolution can depend critically on the degree of openness. 4 For example, it will be shown that when countries trade, it is possible for a shakeout to occur in only one country. If this country is not the US, then the empirical identification of conditions that generate a shakeout are severely compromised. In fact, a focus on just US data would mistakenly record no shakeout at all.
The model we develop shares the feature that innovation is necessary for a shakeout to occur.
However, in our model it is only one of a number of factors that interact to shape the evolution of an industry's market structure. As in the previous literature technological change is the source of any heterogeneity among firms. Though, in contrast to this literature, firm heterogeneity is derived as an equilibrium outcome of a technology adoption game, rather than imposed exogenously. The firms involved in this technology adoption game are assumed to produce differentiated products and therefore have market power. Importantly, the profits associated with this market power are used to defray the sunk costs of entry along with any recurring fixed costs. What we show is that for a given innovation, the size of the recurring fixed costs relative to the sunk entry costs is an important determinant of the likelihood of a shakeout. In particular, the higher the recurring fixed costs relative to the sunk entry costs, the greater is the probability of a shakeout. This result 1 See for example Gort and Klepper (1982) , Klepper and Graddy (1990) , Carroll and Hannan (2000) 2 See Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and Klepper (1996) . 3 Klepper and Simons (1997) examined four indusries that had shakeouts of over 80%. If technological change is the sole determinant of these large shakeouts, one would expect that it should be relatively easy to identify the associated innovation. However, there was no obvious innovation that could be identified as a discrete event that could trigger such shakeouts. 4 For empirical evidence on the relationship between firm heterogeneity and international trade see Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) , Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) . For other models that incorporate international trade and firm level heterogeneity see Bernard, Schott, and Redding (2004), Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005) .
has the intuitively appealing feature that shakeouts are most likely in industries that are not only undergoing technological change but are also relatively easy to enter. Moreover, it illustrates that dramatic technological change is not sufficient for a shakeout to occur. Indeed, a relatively small innovation can cause a shakeout in a market with relatively low sunk entry costs, while a dramatic innovation will have little effect on market structure if sunk entry costs are very large.
While a closed economy analysis is very useful, most manufacturing industries also face international competition. It is well established in the international trade literature that intra-industry trade in differentiated products accounts for the bulk of trade flows. 5 Given that product differentiation is the basis of our model, it is straight forward to extend it to incorporate this primary motivation for international trade. However, an open economy version of the model can take at least as many forms as there are asymmetries between countries. We narrow our focus by restricting attention to the case where the level of technological development varies across countries. In this setting we investigate how trade barriers effect the likelihood of a shakeout, as well as how the rate of firm exit differs across countries. We show that trade barriers lead to a fragmentation of markets, encouraging the entry of firms, raising the likelihood of a shakeout. In more fragmented markets, a given innovation has a more pronounced effect on the profits of firms that lag behind the frontier, raising the chances that these lagging firms will experience negative profits and exit. Therefore, from both a national and international perspective, trade generates a more stable market structure.
In relation to the exit pattern, we show that technological asymmetries can be matched by an asymmetry in the pattern of exits across countries. Specifically, we show that the technologically backward country will always undergo a larger shakeout than the advanced country. In fact for a large range of parameter values the advanced country has a relatively stable market structure, and may even experience an increase in the number of firms as exit in the less advanced country induces entry in the advanced country. These results provide a striking contrast to the closed economy model. The same conditions that generate a shakeout in the closed economy setting are associated with either a constant or growing number of firms for the advanced country in the open economy case. Thus trade generates a more stable industrial evolution from an advanced country perspective. However, a national focus would not accurately identify the mechanism behind this stability. Consequently, single country studies are only likely to provide reliable evidence about the likelihood of a shakeout if there is very little trade. However, industries with this characteristic are increasingly rare, and the introduction of international trade adds an important dimension to the analysis that aides our understanding of the industrial dynamics of industries.
In order to establish these results, the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the closed economy model and derive the equilibrium conditions. In Section 3, we characterize the comparative statics of the closed economy model. Section 4 extends the model to allow for international trade.
In this section we present a closed economy model of industrial evolution that is driven by technology adoption. We consider an industry that is created at time t = 0 by the introduction of some rudimentary technology. A superior technology also exists, but its implementation at t = 0 is not commercially viable. Nevertheless, all firms are aware of the potential of these hi-tech methods when they make their entry decisions. It is the adoption of the new technology that drives the evolution of the industry. Instead of treating technology adoption as an exogenous and random process, we endogenize technology adoption decisions using a standard game-theoretic treatment of technology diffusion that dates back to the work of Reinganum (1981) . In this section we consider a closed economy model with an industry characterized by monopolistic competition. 6 The main contribution of this section is to show how a straightforward modification of technology diffusion models can generate industry shakeout phenomena. 7
Demand
We assume that the economy has two sectors: one sector consists of a numeraire good, x 0 , while the other sector is characterized by differentiated products. The preferences of a representative consumer are defined by the following intertemporal utility function:
where x 0 (t) is consumption of the numeraire good in time t and C(t) represents an index of consumption of the differentiated goods. For C(t) we adopt the CES specification which reflects tastes for variety in consumption and also imposes a constant (and equal) elasticity of substitution between every pair of goods:
where y(z, t) represents consumption of brand z at time t and n(t) represents the number of varieties available at time t. It is straightforward to show that, with these preferences, the elasticity of substitution between any two products is σ = 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 and aggregate demand for good i at any point in time is given by:
where p(i, t) is the price of good i in time t and E represents total number of consumers in the economy.
6 See Bagwell and Staiger (1992) for a model of trade and technology that emphasizes strategic issues. 7 By considering adoption in a setting of monopolistic competition we are following Gotz (1999) and Ederington and McCalman (2004) . However, neither of these papers address the issue of how technology adoption effects the evolution of market structure.
Production
All goods are produced in the economy using constant returns to scale technologies and a single factor of production, labor. Thus, production of any good (or brand) requires a certain amount of labor per unit of output. For simplicity, we assume that production of the numeraire good is defined by l = x 0 which ensures that the equilibrium wage is equal to unity.
Firms can enter the differentiated goods sector by paying a sunk entry fee of F 0 . We assume that varieties of the differentiated good can be produced using either of two types of technology. A low-productivity technology is always available to any firm upon entering the industry. Production using the low-productivity technology is defined by l(t) = F + y(t), where F is a fixed per period cost of production. 8 A high-productivity technology is also available at time t = 0, but requires an additional fee of X(t) where X(0) = ∞, X(∞) = 0, X < 0 and X > 0. 9 With this adoption cost function, earlier adoption is more expensive, however, the decreasing costs of technology adoption implies that eventually all firms that remain in the industry will adopt the high-tech process.
Production using the high-productivity technology is defined by l(t) = F + y(t)/ϕ, where ϕ > 1.
The Dixit-Stiglitz preferences result in profit-maximizing firms using a simple mark-up pricing rule for given marginal costs. 10 Thus, the prices set by the low-tech firms and high-tech firms respectively are:
The operating profits of each firm can then be determined as a function of its own and rivals' behavior with the profit differential being given by:
To characterize the price index for the differentiated goods sector, let [0, qn(t) ] be the range of firms that have adopted the high-productivity technology, where q is between 0 and 1 and represents the fraction of firms that have already adopted at a point in time. Then the price index is given by:
Substituting (6) into (5) gives the profit differential as:
Note that the profit differential (π H − π L ) is decreasing as the number of firms producing with the high-tech production process (q) increases. This is because adoption by rival firms reduces the market share of other firms and, thus, the gain to adopting a cost-saving innovation. It is this property of the model that leads to the gradual diffusion of the new technology through the industry as firms must trade off the increased operating profits from early adoption against the lower adoption costs of later adoption.
Adoption Decision
The equilibrium distribution of technologies, q(t), is determined by the firms selection of their optimal adoption dates. A firm chooses the adoption date, T , to maximize the discounted value of total profits:
As can be seen, these profits depend on both the firm's own adoption date, T , and the adoption decisions of rival firms (which is summarized by the distribution function q(t)). Differentiating with respect to T yields the first-order condition:
The above first-order condition demonstrates the trade off faced by firms in the choice of when to adopt. The left-hand side is the lost profits from waiting one more period to adopt the high productivity technology while the right-hand side is the gain from the decrease in adoption costs from delaying adoption another period. Substituting the profit differential given by (7) into this first-order condition and solving for q(t) then gives the equilibrium distribution function. 11
Assuming the fixed costs of production are sufficiently low, operating profits will be positive in each time period and firms will choose to never exit the industry, with all entry occurring at t = 0. 12
Consequently, for sufficiently low F , n(t) = n for all t. In this case the equilibrium distribution function is given by:
11 The second order condition is also assumed to hold: r(ϕ σ−1 − 1)πL(q(T ))e −rT − X (T ) < 0 12 To see that all entry occurs at t = 0, suppose that the contrary were true and a mass of firms entered at a later date.
Since both types of entrants must make zero profits over the life of their operation, this implies that πL(0) − F = rFo (i.e. net period profits must equal interest savings). In addition, the late entrants must pick when to enter. The first order condition implies
Using the condition πL(0) − F = rFo, we see the entry decision for the latecomers is very similar to the decision of the first adopter, with the exception that if the first adopter is an incumbent, then they face n competitors, while a later entrant will face n + ne competitors. Consequently, the profit differential will be greater for an incumbent, so the potential entrants won't enter as the first adopters. Repetition of this argument for each subsequent adopter generates the result that an incumbent will adopt before the potential entrants. Finally, the potential entrants can't be the last adopter since this would imply πH (1) − F < πL(0) − F = rFo (i.e. other investment opportunities offer a higher return). Therefore, there will not be entry at any time other that t = 0 for sufficiently small F .
The above distribution function describes industry evolution in the closed economy case. Given initially high adoption costs, all firms are low-tech until T L . At T L the first firm adopts the highproductivity technology and, as adoption costs fall, more firms adopt the new technology leading to a gradual diffusion of the new technology through the industry for periods T L ≤ t ≤ T H (where the fraction of firms that have adopted at any point in time is given by q * (t)). Finally, all firms will have adopted the new technology by period T H .
Present Value of Profits
Since F is assumed to be sufficiently low, the number of firms is constant through time. To close the model we now solve for the equilibrium number of firms, n. The present value of profits is derived by substituting in the respective profit and distribution functions. Given perfect foresight, firms will enter the industry until the present value of profits are equal to zero:
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem verifies that equilibrium profits are declining in n. This ensures a unique equilibrium for the constant n case. Given entry occurs until the present value of profits is equal to zero, this zero-profit condition along with q(t) * (defined by 10) characterizes the closed economy equilibrium.
Characteristics of the No-Exit Equilibrium
To this point we have claimed that an equilibrium with a constant number of firms requires that F is sufficiently small. We will now be more precise about this requirement and its implications.
Since per-period profits are strictly positive for sufficiently small F , the exposition of the no-exit equilibrium is most transparent when F = 0. In this case the zero profit condition can be expressed as:
The no-exit equilibrium also requires that a low technology firm cannot profitability stay in the market permanently (i.e., eventually X(T ) decreases to the point where all firms adopt the new technology):
Note that (12) and (13) imply that
. This says that the present value of post adoption profits are greater than adoption costs. Consequently, the zero profit condition can only hold if sunk entry costs, F o , are not paid off until after all firms have adopted the new technology (i.e., after T H ). That is some of the post adoption profits are used to cover the entry cost. This provides insight into why the number of firms is constant through time. High entry costs ensure that firms must remain in the industry for a long time in order to cover these costs. This provides the industry with a strong stabilizing force.
For small F the above analysis is essentially unchanged except (12) and (13) are now given by:
From (14) and (15) there exists a date when F o is paid-off, T ≥ T H , such that:
This equation implicitly defines the date that F o is paid-off. Equation (16) has a number of interesting properties, not the least of which is that the composition of fixed costs can be changed (holding the value of total fixed costs constant) in such a way that F o is paid off earlier. To see this start from F = 0, and imagine decreasing entry costs, F o , and increasing fixed per-period costs, F , such that the present value of profits over the lifetime of the firm remains constant (i.e., F o + F r is a constant). Note that such a trade-off (i.e., dF o = −d F r < 0) will hold n, T L and T H constant over some range of F and F o . However, as F o is decreased, the date at which F o is paid-off will occur earlier in equilibrium (i.e., for (16) to hold, it must be the case that dF o < 0 implies d T < 0). It proves informative to focus on the case whereT = T H , since this allows the parameter space to be divided between combinations of F o and F that cannot involve exit and those where exit is possible. A characteristic of theT = T H situation is that the last adopter is indifferent between staying in the market to payoff X(T H ) or not adopting and exiting at T H . Both options result in discounted profits of zero. Thus, atT = T H the following conditions hold in equilibrium:
These equations define a situation where a low-tech firm is just indifferent between adopting the new technology at T H or exiting the industry. Thus, these conditions endogenize the exit decision as a function of the relative sizes of F o and F . Furthermore, note that F defines the largest per-period fixed cost that is consistent with a no shakeout equilibrium.
Shakeouts
An obvious result of this trade-off is that low-tech firms begin making negative per-period profits at some point during the diffusion process. As we show in the following proposition, such negative profits will necessarily result in the exit from the industry of a group of low-tech firms, provided that these firms have paid-off the entry cost.
PROPOSITION 1 Assuming F is sufficiently high (F > F ) and F o is sufficiently small (F o < F o ), a group of low-tech firms will choose to exit the industry once per-period profits become zero.
Proof: From the point whereT = T H continue to decrease F o such that dF o = −d F r < 0. Assume that no firms exit the market (i.e., n remains constant). In this case, for (14) to continue to hold, given our definition ofT , requires that:
However, given that we increased F from the point defined by (19) implies that for (14) to hold requires that
However, this is inconsistent with the no-exit equilibrium since it implies that low-tech firms can make positive lifetime profits by remaining in the market until per-period profits become zero and then exiting (i.e., since they have already paid off their sunk entry costs atT ). Thus, the no-exit equilibrium is no longer sustainable. Q.E.D.
An implication of Proposition 1 is that the number of firms is no longer a constant through time,
with at least some low-tech firms having an incentive to exit. The intuition behind this result is direct. The gradual diffusion of the high-tech methods through the industry results in lower industry prices and profits. Eventually, per-period profits are diminished to the point where at least some of the low-tech firms would prefer to exit from the industry.
The presence of this period of exit is a common feature in industrial evolution. For example, of the 46 industries studied by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990) , 22 experienced a shakeout. These episodes of firm exit were non-trivial with an average of 52% of the firms leaving the industry. 13 A noteworthy feature of this period of exit is how sudden and dramatic it can be.
Thus, the focus in the literature lies not only in explaining why firms exit an industry, but also why such periods of exit can be so dramatic (i.e., why do "shakeouts" exist). While our framework provides an incentive for low-tech firms to exit, the natural question is what the pattern of exit looks like. While the gradual diffusion of technology through the industry suggests that a gradual exit of firms is a likely pattern, we show in the following proposition that a more dramatic transformation occurs.
PROPOSITION 2 All firms that exit, do so at the same date (i.e., a shakeout occurs)
Proof: Let T S define the date that the shakeout occurs. For a low tech firm to leave the industry it must be the case that their profits are non-positive:
And the entry costs are paid-off:
Using the first order condition of an adopting firm implies:
Since the T S that solves this equation is unique, all firms that exit must do so at T S . Note that by
This dramatic exit of firms is driven by f eedback between the exit decisions and technology adoption decisions of low-tech firms. Specifically, the reduction in the number of firms brought on by exit increases the incentive for the remaining firms to adopt the high-productivity technology, however this increase in adoption induces more low-tech firms to exit. Thus, this positive feedback results in exit being sudden rather than gradual. What is novel about our framework is that traditional models of industry shakeout assume some degree of randomness or exogeneity in the technology adoption process. In contrast, in our model firm heterogeneity is derived endogenously as an equilibrium outcome of a deterministic framework.
A characteristic of the no shakeout equilibrium is that once firms enter at t = 0 there is no incentive for further entry at other dates or for firms to exit. However, the same variation in F and F o that provided the conditions for firms to exit, also raises the possibility that firms might also enter, especially at some date after the shakeout. This logic is confirmed in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3 If there is a shakeout and X(t) has the assumed properties, then there is an incentive for hi-tech firms to enter at or after T H .
Proof: Let n p denote the number of firms that enter at time t = 0 and remain in the market permanently. Similarly define n d as the number of firms that enter at t = 0 but only remain in the market temporarily. For a firm to be indifferent between entering at t = 0 or some date up to T L requires:
Note that this implies from T H to ∞ the following is true:
Note also that for T S < T H it must be the case that
In addition if F o > 0 then:
Nevertheless, since X < 0 and X(∞) = 0, there exists a T such that late entry will occur (i.e. ∃ a
r ). Q.E.D. A feature of Proposition 3 is that, following the shakeout, new firms will only enter the industry as high-tech firms. 15 Thus, entry costs at any point in time are implicitly F o + X(T ). However, note that this implies that, with exogenous technological progress, the costs of entering the industry are 15 While the phenomena of late entry into mature industries does not typically appear of the list of stylized facts explained by models of shakeouts, Jovanovic (2001) suggests that these lists should be amended to include late entry.
declining over time. Thus, Proposition 3 implies that eventually these technological costs will be reduced to the point where entry occurs. 16 Given that late entry occurs, it should happen at an optimal date. The optimal late entry date T e must maximize:
Solving the first order condition gives the time path of n(t) after T e as:
Given a pool of potential late entrants, the profits of these firms must be driven to zero:
Entry also ensures that the present value of profits for firms that are in the market permanently are also zero. As before, let n p denote the number of firms that remain in the market permanently and n d denote the number of firms that enter at t = 0 but only remain in the market until T S :
Finally, the zero profit condition for low-tech firms that exit the market requires that:
Using (27) and (25), (26) can be simplified to:
Note in particular that this is only a function of n p . Therefore, to solve for n d , (28) can be combined with (27).
To complete the description of the equilibrium, the distribution function needs to be derived.
Since firms that adopt the high-tech methods stay in the market forever, and late entry of additional high-tech firms occurs after T H , the first order conditions for firms that enter at t = 0 and adopt are exactly the same as in the no shakeout case. However, since there is a shakeout during the adoption process, the equilibrium distribution function now has a discontinuity at T S , reflecting the change 16 These results are derived under the assumption that X(∞) = 0. However, if X(t) is bounded away from zero then late entry may not occur. in the number of firms in the market:
Intuitively, the positive feedback between firm exit and adoption results in a jump in the number of firms adopting the high-tech methods at the time of the shakeout. Therefore the shakeout equilibrium is described by n p , n d , n(t), q * (t), T S and T e .
Comparative Statics
In the previous section, we characterized both the shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria. In this section, we investigate the comparative statics of this model. It should be apparent from the discussion above that the basic parameters that determine whether a shakeout is likely to occur are the size of the sunk costs of entering the market relative to the recurring fixed costs of production,
given the existence of an innovation. The interaction between these two variables in determining the occurrence of a shakeout are clarified in figure 2. To interpret figure 2 consider starting from a point on the horizontal axis where per-period fixed costs are zero and thus no shakeout occurs. As in the previous section, imagine trading off F o and F along the line with slope −r. Consider the case where T = T H and the last low-tech firm is indifferent between adopting and remaining in the market, or not adopting and exiting. This point is characterized by (18) and (19), which are associated with a unique F/F o ratio (denoted by the ray from the origin). Finally, as discussed in the previous section, any additional trade-off between F and F o will result in a shakeout. Thus, figure 2 illustrates the division of the parameter space between shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria where higher ratios of F/F o increase the probability that an industry will undergo a shakeout, holding the size of the innovation constant. The intuition behind this division of the parameter space is direct, the easier it is to enter (low F o ) and the more sensitive firms are to technological change (high F ), the more likely a shakeout becomes. Moreover, this result illustrates that dramatic technological change is not sufficient for a shakeout to occur. Indeed, a relatively small innovation can cause a shakeout in a market with relatively low sunk entry costs, while a dramatic innovation will have little effect on market structure if sunk entry costs are very large.
While the interaction of technological change and fixed costs are the main determinants of industry shakeout, it of interest to explore how the likelihood of a shakeout is influenced by other parameters in the model. In the context of figure 2, this can be determined by calculating how changes in parameter values effect the F/F o cut-off between the shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4 A shakeout is more likely (i.e. the critical F/F o that divides the shakeout equilibria from the no-shakeout equilibria is lower) the higher is:
ii) the elasticity of demand, σ, iii) the innovative step, ϕ.
However, the likelihood of a shakeout is independent of market size, E.
Proof: A shakeout becomes possible when the following two conditions hold:
From these equations it is clear that if F o is increased, F must increase more than proportionally for these conditions to be met. Consequently, starting from a higher F o when F = 0 lowers the probability of a shakeout.
The affect of changes in ϕ, σ and E on the F /F o can be confirmed by totally differentiating (30). Q.E.D.
Note that an increase in either the step size of the innovation or an increase in the elasticity of demand increase the likelihood of a shakeout. Intuitively this is due to the fact that more important technological innovations or increased elasticity of demand place low-tech firms at a greater disadvantage during the diffusion process. Thus, low-tech firms are more likely to experience negative per-period profits, and subsequently more likely to exit the industry.
Similar intuition implies that increases in the step size of the innovation or the elasticity of demand should also effect the timing and magnitude of the shakeout. This intuition is borne out by the following two propositions:
PROPOSITION 5 Given a shakeout occurs, T S will be earlier the larger is:
ii) the elasticity of demand, σ,
iii) the innovative step, ϕ.
However, the timing of a shakeout is independent of market size, E Proof: If a shakeout occurs it must be the case that T S ∈ [T L , T H ]. Combining the first order conditions with the zero per-period profit condition implicitly defines the timing of the shakeout,
The proposition follows directly from the differentiation of this condition. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 6 Given F o = 0 (a shakeout must occur), the relative magnitude of the shakeout is larger, the larger is:
i) the elasticity of demand, σ, ii) the innovative step, ϕ.
However, the magnitude of a shakeout is independent of market size, E Proof: Consider the jump in the distribution at T S . If we define the maximum value of the distribution function before the jump as q and the minimum value of the distribution function after the jump as q, then from (29) the size of this difference must satisfy:
In this special case q − q = 1, which implies:
Consequently, increases in the step size of an innovation or the elasticity of demand increase the magnitude of shakeout. However, the magnitude of the shakeout is independent of market size, E.
Q.E.D.
The fact that increases in the size of the high-tech innovation and elasticity of demand cause shakeouts to be larger and occur earlier in equilibrium requires little explanation since, as previously explained, such changes have a disproportionately negative impact on low-tech firms in the diffusion process. The fact that market size has no impact on the likelihood, timing or magnitude of shakeouts requires more discussion since it has strong implications for the structure of shakeouts in an open economy. Specifically, a primary difference across countries is market size (e.g., countries are much more likely to exhibit vast differences in market size than in the the elasticity of demand for a product). Thus, the combined lesson of these Propositions is that, for a non-traded good, the shakeout phenomena should be quite similar across countries (i.e., shakeouts should occur at roughly equal times and be of equal magnitude). In the following sections, we convert our technology adoption
model to an open economy setting to see how international trade affects this conclusion.
Shakeouts and International Trade
The preceding section characterized a shakeout in a closed economy. This focus on a closed economy mirrors the emphasis in the existing empirical and theoretical literature that has sought to understand shakeouts in a domestic US context. However, such a focus neglects the role that international factors can play in determining the evolution of an industry's market structure. In particular, international trade decouples the link between consumption and production. The implication of this for the evolution of market structure are evident in the media with seemingly constant reference to the threat posed by import competition to domestic firms. In this case, international trade represents an increase in productive capacity that can reduce the number of domestic firms, in much the same way that an innovation does. However, this is only one side of the story. Access to international markets also allows firms to export their surplus production to other countries. This offers a potentially important way to accommodate the extra capacity created by the adoption of a better technology, mitigating the possibility of a domestic shakeout. Moreover, if there is intra-industry trade, then both mechanisms can potentially operate. This suggests that the extent of openness of an industry is likely to be an important factor determining the evolution of market structure.
However, extending the model to allow for international trade also introduces a number of new questions. In particular, how does the degree of openness affect the probability of a shakeout?
Moreover, countries need not share a common evolution of market structure. This naturally raises the question of whether countries experience shakeouts of the same magnitude or whether shakeouts occur at the same time across different countries. The answers to these questions will rely to some extent on whether or not there are differences across countries and whether these difference influence the pattern of trade. For instance, in a symmetric setting with non-prohibitive trade barriers it is straight forward to show that both countries simultaneously experience shakeouts of the same order 
Asymmetric Adoption Costs
While countries can differ in a number of dimensions, the synthetic dye example suggests that differences in adoption costs are an important factor determining the longevity of firms. Guided by this example, we assume that the cost of the high tech methods in the foreign country are prohibitive (i.e. X(t) = ∞ for all t). Since this makes countries asymmetric we denote foreign variables by a star ( * ). To explore the implications of varying the degree of openness, we assume that exporting firms face transport costs of the traditional iceberg form where b ≥ 1 units of a good need to be shipped for one unit to arrive. Thus, while each firm's pricing rule in its domestic market is the same as before (and given by (4)), firms that export will set higher prices in the foreign markets to reflect the higher marginal cost of serving those markets:
From these prices, we can then solve for the operating profits of each firm.
Free Trade
As a benchmark case consider free trade (i.e. b = 1) and the international distribution of production in this setting. Once again it is possible to imagine a situation where entry costs are sufficiently high and per-period operating costs are sufficiently low (e.g., F = 0) that no firm with an incentive to enter the industry would ever consider leaving. Consequently, if the parameters imply that there is no shakeout in equilibrium, then these conditions also imply that there are no foreign firms in the market and all production is concentrated in the home economy.
However, the location of production can be more varied if a shakeout occurs in equilibrium.
To generate a shakeout the now familiar exercise of trading-off F o and F can be employed, with a critical F o and F that separates the shakeout from the no-shakeout equilibria. As this trade-off continues, the size of the shakeout increases. While a particular combination of F o and F generates a shakeout of a given size as it did in a closed economy, in contrast to the closed economy case, the location of the firms that exit is no longer uniquely determined. Under free trade, if it is feasible for a home firm to enter and subsequently exit the market before adopting the high-technology, then it is also possible for a foreign firm to do the same. Since the location of production has no impact on the degree of competition faced by firms in either country, the location of firms that exit during the shakeout is arbitrary in equilibrium.
Single Country Shakeouts
In contrast, if an arbitrarily small trade barrier is introduced then the international distribution of firm exit is uniquely determined. A small trade barrier has very little effect on the number of firms in the market or the per-period profits that firms in either location earn. However, the country with the smallest production does receive a slight benefit from the trade barriers. In this case, the major source of competition is from abroad and a trade barrier of any size helps to mitigate this competition, raising per-period profits slightly for these protected firms. The key question is which country is receiving the benefit of this protection? If we consider shakeouts in the neighborhood of the critical F o and F that separate the shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria, then the number of firms that exit is small relative to the firms that adopt the superior technology and remain in the market. The following proposition characterizes the location of production and firm exit in this case:
PROPOSITION 7 If a shakeout occurs and the parameters are such that the number of permanent firms is greater than the number of firms that exit, then all the exit occurs in the foreign country (n * d > 0 and n d = 0) and all the permanent firms are located in the home country (n p > 0).
Proof: Since a shakeout is assumed to occur, it must be the case that at the time of the shakeout low tech firms in both countries must be making either zero or negative net per-period profits.
Per-period profits for low-tech home firms are:
Per-period profits for foreign low-tech firms are:
While b is close to unity, it is strictly greater than 1. Therefore the ranking of profits in these two locations depends on π * L − π L . The sign of this difference is given by the sign of n p (q(ϕ σ−1 − 1) + 1) + n d − n * d , which is negative since n p > n d + n * d . Therefore, at the time of the shakeout:
Since foreign low-tech firms always have higher period profits than home low-tech, they will have paid off the entry cost, F o before the home low-tech firms. Hence, foreign low-tech firms will exit when their net per-period profits become zero having just paid off the entry costs. In contrast, low-tech home firms begin making negative net per-period profits before they have paid off F o , consequently they have an incentive to remain in the market to adopt the superior technology. Therefore the
This proposition says that for relatively small shakeouts, all the exit will occur in the foreign country. However, it is not immediately obvious that exit in the foreign country must take the form of a shakeout, especially since firms are asymmetric across countries and trade barriers serve to partially isolate the foreign country from the process of technology adoption. This suggests that it might be possible for foreign firms to leave the industry gradually, maintaining the zero per-period profit condition over some interval of time. However, exit of foreign firms increases the incentive for home firms to adopt, encouraging further exit. This feedback mechanism operates to generate a shakeout in the foreign country, though the size of trade barriers do play a role in shaping this pattern of exit. The following proposition characterizes the behavior of foreign firms:
PROPOSITION 8 If trade barriers are sufficiently low, then all foreign firms that exit do so at the same date, T * S .
Proof: Since the profits of low tech firms are declining as more firms adopt the hi tech methods, low tech firms have an incentive to exit provided they have paid-off their entry costs and their per-period profits are non-positive. Since foreign firms have an incentive to exit, it must be the case that:
where π * L (q) are a low tech firms profits in the foreign market and π L (q) are the profits of a low-tech firm serving the home market. Since the incentive to exit arises as home firms are adopting the advanced technology, the first order conditions imply:
Using (32), this first order condition can be simplified to:
Solving for the share of home firms that have adopted the high-tech methods at T * S yields:
Note that for q(T * S ) ∈ [0, 1] requires:
Substituting (33) into (32) gives:
If b is close to 1 (low trade barriers) and (34) holds, then n * < 0 (i.e., no foreign firms can survive after T * S ). Q.E.D.
Multi-country Shakeouts
It is important to note that Proposition 7 characterizes the equilibrium distribution of firms when less than 50% of firms shakeout out of the market. However, it is also possible for shakeouts to involve more than 50% of firms exiting. From the previous section we know that the relative size of a shakeout can be approximated by
np ≈ ϕ σ−1 − 1, with this approximation being more accurate the closer F o is to zero. Consequently, when ϕ σ−1 > 2 we can always find a sufficiently small F o such that more than 50% of the firms exit.
However, as the number of firms located in the foreign country increases, the primary source of competition for firms in this location also begins to change. In particular, the increase in the number of foreign firms increases the degree of competition between these firms and decreases the extent of competition from firms based in the home country. As a result, trade barriers offer some protection for the home firms from the now more numerous foreign firms. This protection raises the profitability of the home low-tech firms relative to the low-tech foreign firms. This is especially true when all firms are low-tech (i.e. before home firms begin to adopt the superior technology).
However, this advantage cannot be permanent in equilibrium. 19 It is the adoption of the superior technology that erodes the advantage of the low-tech home firms. Once home firms begin to adopt the new technology, the competition in the home market (indexed by n p (q(ϕ σ−1 − 1) + 1) + n d ) increases relative to the extent of competition in the foreign market (index by n * d ). Since the trade barriers partially isolate the foreign firms from the more competitive high-tech home firms, the process of technology adoption reduces foreign profits relatively less than for a low-tech home firm.
This mechanism ultimately creates a relative profit advantage for the low-tech foreign firms over a low-tech home firm. Consequently it is possible for a low tech home firm to pay-off their entry costs before a foreign firm, and it is also possible for a low-tech home firm to make zero per-period operating profits before a foreign firm. Therefore, it is possible for both countries to experience a shakeout. But as the following proposition proves, these shakeouts occur at different times and are of different intensities.
PROPOSITION 9
If ϕ σ−1 > 2 and F o is sufficiently low that both countries have a shakeout, then the shakeouts occur at different times across countries, with the shakeout in the home country occurring first (T * S > T S ), but the magnitude of the shakeout is greater in the foreign country (n * d > n d ).
Proof: Assuming that both countries experience a shakeout, low-tech firms must be able to pay-off the entry cost:
19 If the advantage of the home firms did persist in equilibrium, then all of the shakeout would be concentrated in the home market with no firms ever entering in the foreign market. But if this is the case, then the foreign market would not be a competitive environment and trade barriers would offer any firm willing to enter protection from competition from abroad, raising foreign profits above low-tech home profits. This is clearly a contradiction.
In addition, firms in both locations must have an incentive exit with operating profits for low-tech firms equally zero at some point:
Let's first deal with the timing of the shakeouts. Assume that T S > T * S . This implies:
However, this means:
Which can't be part of an equilibrium that features T S > T * S . Note also, that T S = T * S can't be part of an equilibrium either, since firms are paying off F o at different rates through time. Consequently, it is not possible for both the present value and the zero operating profits conditions to hold simultaneously in both countries. Therefore, T * S > T S is the only possible configuration consistent with equilibrium.
The relative intensity of the shakeouts follows directly from the requirement that profits of firms in the foreign country must be lower than the profits of firms at home before the process of adoption has begun (i.e. when all firms are low-tech). This requires π L − π * L > 0 before T L . However, this implies that n * d > n p + n d . Therefore, n * d > n d and the foreign country experiences a more intense shakeout. Q.E.D.
This proposition can be understood with the aid of figure 3. When firms in both countries have symmetric technology (before T L ), the greater number of foreign firms reduces the per-period profits in this location below those of home firms. However, once the adoption process starts, low-tech home firms feel the change in the competitive pressure more than the foreign firms. At some point the increase in the competitive pressure at home pushes the operating profits of low-tech home firms below their foreign counterparts. After this change in the ranking of profits occurs, low-tech home firms find that their operating profits are eventually driven to zero at T S . At this point these firms have also paid-off their entry costs, F o , which is the area between the per-period profit curve and the per-period fixed cost line, F . At T S , a foreign firm has not yet paid-off F o , and therefore still is earning positive operating profits. However, the process of continued adoption in the home country drives the operating profits of foreign firms to zero. In equilibrium this coincides with the date at which the entry costs are paid-off, T * S . Propositions 7 and 9 have important implications for empirical studies that attempt to identify the factors that generate a shakeout. As noted previously the current literature has focused solely on the domestic number of firms and changes in the domestic market structure. Since these studies examine US industries in the 20th century, it is natural to assume that not only is technological change underlying the dynamics of market structure but that the US industries are also the technology leaders. Viewed from this perspective propositions 7 and 9 have important implications for these studies. In particular, these propositions imply that two industries can have exactly the same characteristics (market size, rate of technological change, elasticity of demand, IRS and barriers to entry), but the domestic evolution of market structure can be completely different depending on their extent of international integration. Suppose that one of the industries is closed to trade and experiences a shakeout where half of the firms exit during the shakeout. If the only difference between the two industries is that one is open to trade, then the open industry will not experience any shakeout at all. Even if the shakeout in the closed industry is greater than 50%, the open industry is likely to only experience are very small decline in the number of firms. Indeed, when a shakeout occurs, regardless of its location, the conditions for proposition 3 are satisfied and there will be late entry in the home country by hi-tech firms. Clearly, openness to trade can have a profound affect on the evolution of domestic market structure, yet this has played no role in the current literature. Proof: Under free trade it is assumed that:
Trade Barriers and Shakeouts
Note that these conditions are exactly the same for both home and foreign firms under free trade.
However, if trade barriers exist (b > 1) then the profit conditions for a foreign and home firm diverge.
If there is no shakeout, the conditions remain the same for home firms, while the conditions for a foreign firms become:
While the foreign firm has not paid-off F o , its operating profits are still positive. Hence, if b is made sufficiently large, a foreign firm will be able to pay-off the F o . If this occurs before T H , then any foreign firm that enters will also have an incentive to exit the industry (i.e. shakeout). Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the introduction of trade barriers creates a more fragmented international market, especially from the perspective of foreign firms. The protection provided by trade barriers creates a window of opportunity for foreign firms to enter the market, since they now have higher profitability than under free trade. This additional profitability allows them to pay-off their entry costs before the competitive pressures associated with the adoption of better technology by home firms result in negative operating profits. Consequently, the erection of trade barriers can raise the likelihood of a shakeout. In contrast, free trade is associated with a more stable market structure. 20 Figure 4 illustrates this result.
20 The result that greater openness leads to a more stable market structure can also be derived in a symmetric country setting. In particular, assume that countries are symmetric but that firms within countries can be asymmetric in terms of whether or not they export. This decision can be endogenized by including a sunk cost of exporting as in Ederington and McCalman (2004) . As a direct implication of Proposition 4 in Ederington and McCalman (2004) it follows that as trade barriers are lowered the per-period profits of the last adopter (a non-exporter) must increase.
This increase in profitability is associated with a higher proportion of profits being earned after the adoption process is complete, a situation that discourages firm exit, lowering the likelihood of a shakeout. 
Empirical Evidence
A consistent result of the preceding propositions is that the more open an industry is to international trade, the more stable the resulting market structure. Specifically, the more open an economy is the less likely a shakeout is to occur, and if a shakeout does occur it will be less severe in a more open setting. Table 1 provides evidence consistent with these predictions. Based on the industries studied by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990) , we divide industries into those that experienced a dramatic adjustment in firm numbers after the number of firms had reached a peak, and compared them to those industries that had very little post peak adjustment. This demarcation was based on industries that had greater than 4 net exits per year after the peak (11 industries), and industries that had one or less net exits per year (18 industries). Both sets of industries are similar in terms of longevity, with the average birth date of 1930 for industries with a dramatic adjustment and 1934 for the more stable industries. However, they differ in terms of when the peak in the number occurs, with a mean date of 1953 for the dramatic adjustment industries and 1971 for the stable industries. Two measures of openness are employed, the fraction of domestic output exported and the fraction of domestic output traded (i.e. imports + exports). These data are reported for two time periods, 1958-68 and 1970-80 . As is apparent from these numbers, the more stable industries have higher average export and trade shares across both periods, consistent with the prediction that more open industries are also more stable. However, while this In addition, the specific products analyzed by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990) are mapped into more the aggregate categories of the 1972 four digit SIC. Finally, other dimensions of industry heterogeneity are not taken into account, especially the size of sunk costs and the size of innovation. Nevertheless, the table does suggest that the more stable industries are in sectors with a greater openness to trade.
Conclusion
Single country studies of industrial evolution have documented pronounced patterns in prices, output and firm numbers. The variation in firm numbers has been particularly intriguing since many industries have experienced dramatic shakeouts. These shakeouts have generally been attributed to technological change, with formal models developed to incorporate this mechanism. However, by only considering closed economy models, the literature has neglected the important role that international trade can play in industrial evolution. In particular, models with international trade can feature very different patterns of firm exit both within and across countries.
To develop a model capable of matching the evidence from national studies of industrial evolution that is also consistent with the patterns of international trade, we utilize a model of product differentiation. This model refines the factors that contribute to a shakeout. In particular, we show that it is the interaction of technological change, entry costs and recurring fixed costs that create the conditions for a shakeout. Specifically, for a given pattern of technological change, the higher is the recurring fixed costs relative to the entry costs, the higher is the likelihood of a shakeout. We also show that markets which have a more elastic demand or are more innovative are also more likely experience a shakeout, and when they do these shakeouts occur earlier and are more dramatic.
The extension of the model to incorporate international trade illustrates the shortcoming of a solely national view of industrial evolution. In particular, we show that industries that are more integrated by international trade are also likely to have a lower probability of a shakeout. Thus trade generates a more stable industrial evolution, both from a national and international perspective. 
